Welcome to the fourth installment of “Messing with Philosophers.” Berkeley is the victim and I’m messing with his Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous. I think the arguments in these dialogues are more interesting when “God” is left out. An idea of God is not necessary for the arguments to work but is awkwardly used so that Berkeley can get the conclusion he wants. The conclusion I want doesn’t toss in God. This is actually something that interests me so I’ll probably stay closer to the text… sorry for the length.
You hear of an Irishman living down the street who supposedly holds the extravagant opinion that there is no material substance in the world. You hear that this man was once a famous philosopher and theologian until he lost his belief in God – he has since moved away from academics. Intrigued, you seek this man out.
You knock once on his door and the Irishman opens it immediately. He stands there with a torch in hand and brings it in proximity to your arm. You feel the heat and notice that a couple arm hairs have disappeared. “You’ve burned me!” “Come in, sit down.” He throws the torch in the fireplace and reflects on how clever he is for always waiting behind the door, ready to burn people. “Did it hurt?” “Yes of course it hurt, it is hot.” “Can you imagine perceiving that heat without a certain degree of pain?” “No.” “That heat existed but only because you perceived it, heat isn’t a quality of the fire.”
You start to introduce yourself, “my name is…” but he cuts you off by offering you tea. You accept and he brings a mug over that appears to be empty. While you are distracted by the empty mug he pokes you with a pin – a tiny drop of blood rolls down your arm. “Did it hurt?” Yes! What are you doing? That’s sharp!” He takes his seat once more – “heat is hot and pins are sharp because of the pain they afford you. Heat and sharpness are not qualities of substances, they exist only for you as a perceiving being.”
Worrying for your health you wonder if you should leave or stay. Still holding the pin he asks “do you agree that these sensations exist only in your mind, that heat exists only in your interaction with the fire and sharpness in your interaction with the pin? What if I say to you that the case is the same with regard to all sensible qualities and that they cannot be supposed to exist without your perceiving them?” Wanting to leave you look towards the door, the man across from you doesn’t seem to care whether or not you answer his questions.
“Eat this.” He hands you wormwood, “come on, eat it.” You eat it and exclaim, “it’s bitter.” “Now eat this” – he hands you a square of sugar. “Is it sweet?” “Yes.” He laughs. Feeling somehow offended you try to quell his laughter by saying, “but wormwood is always bitter, sugar always sweet.” You feel confident in asserting that bitterness is a quality of wormwood and sweetness a quality of sugar. He pokes you with the pin one more time. “Sharpness is not a quality of the pin, sweetness is not a quality of sugar – they are only immediate perceptions. Sugar is only sweet when you taste it and declare it so – tastes aren’t inherent in the food.” Once again a drop of blood runs down your arm.
“Follow me out to my patio.” You have come this far and decide to finish the game this old man is playing. He opens the door for you and allows you to step out onto the patio first. He takes advantage of his position behind you, quickly takes off one of his socks and covers your mouth and nose with it. The sock smells horrid and you are about to pass out. Before removing his hand and the sock he asks you a question, “is this smell inherent in the sock or does it exist for you as a perceiving mind?” You shake your head wildly in what you hope will be interpreted as a negative response. The sock is removed and you collapse on one of the chairs set out on the patio. The old man laughs again and puts his sock back on.
Recovering from the sock affront you notice him putting a CD into a stereo sitting on a table. “No! Don’t push play! I get the hint already. Please!” Disappointed the old man puts the CD back in its case. He sits down, looks more relaxed and begins the conversation again: “corporeal bodies seem to be nothing else than a collection of sensible qualities, am I right?” You are too afraid to answer because you are unsure of the consequences of answering incorrectly. A chihuahua runs out on the patio and tries to jump on the lap of the old man – the old man doesn’t help the dog. “To you our chairs are of a normal size, they support our backs and provide comfort to our rears. To this dog these chairs are large, to a fly these chairs are rough, to a fish these chairs are dry. Are you right but the animals wrong?” The dog growls and runs off. “Try and think of motion or extension divested of sensible modes like fast and slow (etc.), great and small (etc.). Like sharpness and sweetness, motion and extension exist only in the mind.”
“Since you let me poke you, I’ll show you how to disappear. Close your eyes for about twenty seconds.” You do so and during these twenty seconds you cannot hear him, smell him or in any way perceive his existence. As soon as you open your eyes he says, “and I’m back!
While still pointing and gasping Plato, in uniform, kicks the door open and is followed by Aristotle. The music stops, the dancing stops, the gasping stops and is replaced by shrieking. Aristotle warns the uniformed Plato, “don’t get too close!” Aristotle is not wearing a uniform and, therefore, cannot restrain Plato from doing what he wants. “I will prove you wrong, Aristotle!” belts Plato. “But you mustn’t, it is too dangerous.” Aristotle weeps.
I’m thinking about turning this “messing with philosophers” thing into a weekly occurrence – but I suppose that will depend on things, dangerous, time consuming things.
To amaze your guests you have invited Wittgenstein over to do his amazing party tricks. You ask him to enter the room after everyone has talked enough about beetles. After the applause dies down and people stop asking him what “Objects” are he announces with a wave of his hand that he will begin his performance. He walks up to friend number 1 and opens this friend’s box, revealing her private idea – a very large heinous beetle is displayed for all to see. He moves on to Friend 2 – a small harmless beetle falls out. Friend 3 – spotted, with two horns like a rhino. Friend 4 – a fly. Finally Wittgenstein moves to your box and everyone holds their breath as he reaches for the lid. You scream, “No!!!!” but it is too late, Wittgenstein has taken your box and shown everyone that it is in fact empty. You feel ashamed, you reconsider giving Wittgenstein his honorarium.